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Note
Address Confidentiality and Real Property
Records: Safeguarding Interests in Land While
Protecting Battered Women
Jonathan Grant*
Unable to sleep, Jane Doe, a Connecticut woman, left the
bedroom she shared with her husband to sleep on the couch in
their living room.' Later that night, her husband came out to
the living room and said to his pregnant wife, "I should just
take both of you out right now."2 The beating he delivered after
those words sent Jane to the hospital. Years after the incident,
Jane still feared her ex-husband, who continued to stalk her
and even appear at her house periodically.! After receiving help
from a domestic violence center, Jane left her home to stay at a
shelter and enrolled in her state's Safe at Home Program.
Through this program, designed to benefit victims of domestic
violence and abuse, she was able to keep her address confiden-
tial and hide her location from her ex-husband." Jane later
claimed this program "saved [her] life."
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011,
Hillsdale College. Thank you to Professor Ann Burkhart for her thoughtful
feedback on this Note. In addition, thank you to the editors and staff of the
Minnesota Law Review, particularly Samuel Bolstad, Laura Farley, Anna
Luczkow, Cassandra Fenton, Alysha Bohanon, Paul Magyar, Kristin McGaver,
and Kim Vipond, for their comments and careful editing to prepare this Note
for publication. Finally, thank you to my family, especially my wife, for inspir-
ing me to pursue a career in law and for their unceasing encouragement
throughout the stresses of law school. Copyright 0 2016 by Jonathan Grant.
1. Evan Lips, Decisive Action Key After Domestic Violence; Connecticut







6. Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-240(e), (g)-(h) (2013) (providing
program participants with an alternate mailing address through the secretary
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Jane Doe's situation is by no means unique,' and many
states have recognized the value of providing battered women a
way to keep their personal information private. Washington, in
1991, was the first state to enact an address confidentiality
program,' and the movement has continued to this day, with
Kentucky passing legislation as recently as 2013.10 To date,
over thirty states have instituted address confidentiality pro-
grams to protect victims of sexual assault, domestic abuse, and
other crimes from perpetrators who track them through public
records." The programs vary from state to state, not only in
their participation requirements but also in the degree of pro-
tection each state offers.12
Some states have given participants very broad protec-
tions, even extending to real property records.'" The expansion
to include property records offers a great benefit to victims. Of-
ten victims must leave their homes to escape abusive situa-
tions, but under most statutes the confidentiality of a victim's
address is not protected when the victim buys or sells real es-
tate and records the conveyance documents in the county land
records."'
of state and the ability to avoid listing an address on voter registry lists).
7. Lips, supra note 1.
8. See NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROLS, NATIONAL DA-
TA ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND STALKING
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-fact-sheet-2014.pdf
("One in 4 women (22.3%) have been the victim of severe physical violence by
an intimate partner. . . .").
9. Jeffrey T. Even, Washington's Address Confidentiality Program: Relo-
cation Assistance for Victims of Domestic Violence, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 523, 524
(1995-1996) ("In 1991, the Washington State Legislature created a unique
program designed to assist victims of domestic abuse.").
10. 2013 Ky. Acts 462 (effective June 25, 2013) (codified at KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14.300-318 (LexisNexis 2013)).
11. See Rebecca E. Shiemke, Domestic Violence Legal Remedies in Other
States, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2011, at 36, 37 (describing protection options availa-
ble for victims of domestic violence); Address Confidentiality Programs, NAT'L
CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/stalking
-resource-center/help-for-victims/address-confidentiality-programs (last visited
Apr. 17, 2016) (listing each state that has an address confidentiality program).
12. See Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, NAT'L NETWORK To END
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July 2013), http//nnedv.org/downloads/SafetyNet/
NNEDVACPChart 2013.pdf.
13. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-483 (2012); MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.01-.12,
13.045 (Supp. 2015); MINN. R. 8290.0100-.1500 (2015).
14. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-2108(8) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15C-8(h) (2015).
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At the same time, however, the expansion to include real
property records introduces significant concerns. Suppressing
documents or even just certain information in documents de-
tracts from an important goal of the country's land recording
systems: to provide the public with notice of matters affecting
property.15 The inability to know who owns a property and view
all relevant documents represents a substantial defect or at
least potential defect in title-a cloud on title-making it less
attractive for parties to enter into transactions involving affect-
ed properties. The lack of notice presents an additional prob-
lem for these transactions, because notice determines the prior-
ity of conveyances and liens in most states.
This Note argues that current statutory attempts to extend
address confidentiality to real estate records are inadequate.
Legislatures must find a solution that properly balances the in-
terests of real estate recording systems and victims of domestic
violence and that protects both interests as fully as possible.
Part I of this Note presents a brief overview of the United
States' property recording systems and describes the develop-
ment of state address confidentiality programs. Part II analyz-
es state statutes extending confidentiality programs to real
property records and discusses the tension between protecting
victims of abuse and maintaining the integrity of land records.
Part III suggests a legislative approach that will better protect
victims whose abusers use public records to track them and
that will also minimize the impact of these protections on the
public notice provided by real estate records. This Note propos-
es an approach based on Minnesota's Safe at Home program,"
but suggests expanding the program's protections to other
property-related records and recommends increased access to
protected records for authorized parties.
15. See Chad J. Pomeroy, A Theoretical Case for Standardized Vesting
Documents, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 957, 969 (2012); John H. Scheid, Down Lab-
yrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guide for First Year Law Students, 80 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 91, 101-02 (2002); Charles Szypszak, North Carolina's
Real Estate Recording Laws: The Ghost of 1885, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 199, 200
(2006) [hereinafter Szypszak, North Carolina].
16. A "cloud on title" is "a defect or potential defect in the owner's title to
a piece of land arising from some claim or encumbrance." Cloud on Title,
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 311 (10th ed. 2014).
17. See 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 92.08(b)-(c) (David A. Thomas
ed., 3d Thomas ed. 2015) (explaining that nearly all states have notice re-
quirements in their recording acts and that notice affects whether a subse-
quent purchaser can have priority).
18. MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.01-.12, 13.045; MINN. R. 8290.0100-.1500.
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I. EXAMINING THE APPLICATION OF ADDRESS
CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAMS TO REAL ESTATE
RECORDS
While recording statutes and real property records have a
history reaching back several centuries, address confidentiality
programs have been in effect for only a few decades. And it is
only in the past several years that any state has taken the step
of including real property records within the coverage of its ad-
dress confidentiality program. This Part presents the current
legal context of real property records and address confidentiali-
ty programs. Section A describes the development of recording
acts and the purpose of the land records system in providing in-
formation about real property. Section B provides an overview
of address confidentiality programs and the protections they
provide for victims of domestic violence. Section C reviews the
history and effect of state statutes that have extended the pro-
tections of address confidentiality programs to include real
property records.
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RECORDING ACTS
The roots of modern recording acts reach back to the early
days of English common law. Under English common law, par-
ties transferred land through an "enfeoffment ceremony."' 9 This
process required that the grantor and grantee perform a cere-
mony on the land being transferred. 20 The grantor would make
a symbolic transfer of the property through the "delivery of a
twig, clod of dirt, or other token of seisin."2' Title to the proper-
ty transferred immediately upon completion of the ceremony. 22
As a result, any later attempt to transfer an interest in the
land was invalid, because the grantor no longer had any inter-
est in the land. From this legal conclusion, English courts de-
veloped the common law principle that the first grantee holds
title free of any claims of the grantor's later grantees.2 ' This
common law rule governing priority of transfers is often ex-
pressed by the maxim "first in time, first in right." 25
19. 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01[1][a],
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This principle worked well for small communities in which
land was rarely transferred. 26 Because of the significance of
land in providing status and the tendency of people to live in
the same location for generations, members of the local com-
27
munity knew who held title to what property.
Over time, statutes permitted sellers to convey property
without performing the enfeoffment ceremony.28 In addition, af-
ter the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677, written
documents were required to convey most property interests.29
The ability to convey property without public knowledge, com-
bined with an increasingly mobile population and the rising use
of mortgages, rendered the "first in time, first in right" ap-
proach an ineffective tool for determining the priority of proper-
ty interests.30 Realizing that a public record would provide a
better method to determine property ownership, England en-
acted the Statute of Enrollments in 1536.1 The statute re-
quired all conveyances of freehold interests to be transferred by
a sealed writing enrolled in one of the King's courts. Grantors
quickly discovered a way to circumvent this requirement, and
the statute was largely ineffective.
The American colonies furthered England's attempts to es-
tablish a public record of land transfers by enacting recording
statutes that encouraged the registration of land conveyances.
Massachusetts instituted the first modem recording statute in
1640.34 Unlike the English Statute of Enrollments, these acts
26. See Scheid, supra note 15, at 93-94.
27. See 14 POWELL, supra note 19.
28. The Statute of Uses, enacted in 1535, allowed owners to convey land
in writing without the enfeoffment ceremony. See id.
29. Id. The Statute of Frauds established that certain oral promises would
not be enforced; thus written contracts were needed to effectively transfer in-
terests in land, enter leases, or grant trusts of land. Statute of Frauds 1677, 29
Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 1-9.
30. See 14 POWELL, supra note 19; see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 586 (1988) (noting that the "doc-
trine does little to put people on notice of who owns what, and the opportuni-
ties for conflicting claims are endless").
31. See Scheid, supra note 15, at 98.
32. Id.
33. See 14 POWELL, supra note 19. Generally parties would convey a one-
year lease, followed by a release of the reversion to the lessee. Scheid, supra
note 15, at 99. Through this two-step process, parties were able to transfer fee
estates without needing to enroll the conveyance. Id.
34. See 14 POWELL, supra note 19, § 82.01[1][b]; Ray E. Sweat, Race,
Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, PROB. &
PROP., May/June 1989, at 27, 27.
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were successful, leading to extensive use of recording systems
to catalogue conveyances of property. Every state now has re-
cording acts that govern the priority of transfers.
The British Statute of Enrollments and colonial recording
laws appear to be what are now referred to as "race" statutes.
Under "race" statutes, the first purchaser to record a convey-
ance holds it against any others claiming title.3 ' There are still
a small number of states that employ "race"-style statutes.3 9 A
disadvantage of "race" recording acts is that they allow no room
for error if a grantee forgets to record his interest or if a con-
veyance is lost or recorded in the wrong location.40 The implica-
tion of such situations was "too much for the [British] courts of
equity and too much for American legislatures as well."' To
address this perceived problem, British courts introduced an
idea of "notice" into their analysis of priority as early as the
nineteenth century.4 2
If there are prior conveyances, the requirement of "notice"
allows a later purchaser to take free of those conveyances only
if he had no knowledge of them.4 3 Under this doctrine,
knowledge can come from facts, in the property records as well
as outside, that would put the purchaser "on notice" of the prior
transfers." This approach to evaluating the priority of land
transfers has been widely accepted, and the vast majority of
American states now employ recording acts that include a "no-
tice" requirement. Roughly half of the states employ recording
acts characterized as pure "notice" statutes.46 The remaining
half of the states have "race-notice" recording acts . Under
35. See Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11
NEV. L.J. 139, 141 (2010).
36. Id. at 141 & n.5.
37. See Rose, supra note 30 ("Their literal language suggests they were
versions of what has come to be called a 'race' statute . . . .").
38. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 92.08(a) ("This
type of recording act is called 'race' because it involves a race to record. The
purchaser who wins the race prevails.").
39. Id. ("Race recording acts of general application are found in only . . .
Delaware, Louisiana, and North Carolina.").
40. See Rose, supra note 30, at 586-87.
41. Id. at 587.
42. Id.




47. Id. § 92.08(c).
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"race-notice" acts, just as with "notice" acts, the person seeking
protection must be a "purchaser for value without knowledge or
notice of the prior unrecorded claim."" In addition, the pur-
chaser must record the conveyance before a previous grantee."
While it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a statute
is a "race-notice" act or a pure "notice" act, notice is an essential
element in both.so
Parties seeking the protection of "race-notice" or "notice"
recording statutes are subject to several types of notice. A pur-
chaser can be "put on notice" through actual notice or construc-
tive notice.5 ' Actual notice is notice from personal knowledge of
the existence of a prior claim. Constructive notice, in contrast,
exists when a party is deemed to have notice of a prior interest
regardless of any actual knowledge he may have. Because a
purchaser of property has a duty to search the real estate rec-
ords, he is held to have notice of all facts "a reasonable title
search of the public real estate records would have revealed."54
In addition, purchasers in many jurisdictions have a duty to in-
spect the property itself and will be deemed to have notice of
anything such an examination would reveal.
The notice requirement illustrates a primary goal of re-
cording systems: to provide people with information about
property.56 Scholars have noted that the "raison d'etre of [re-
cording] systems is to clarify and perfectly specify landed prop-
erty rights for the sake of easy and smooth transfers of land.""
By specifying what claims parties may have to a property, re-




50. See id. § 92.08(d) ("Although a statute on its face may appear to be one
type or the other, judicial gloss may make appearances misleading.").
51. Id. § 92.09(c).
52. Id. § 92.09(c)(1).
53. See id. § 92.09(c)(2).
54. Id. § 92.09(c).
55. Id. § 92.09(c)(3)(A).
56. Pomeroy, supra note 15.
57. See Rose, supra note 30.
58. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 211 ("By making the
public records a more reliable indication of ownership rights, the law unques-




Recording acts, however, do not perfectly achieve their goal
of clarifying what interests affect property.59 The American sys-
tem of land records, unlike those of many other developed coun-
tries, does not provide comprehensive or guaranteed infor-
mation about title to land.6 0 Instead, it accepts and indexes
documents and "relies on searchers to analyze what they find
in the recorded documents and to reach conclusions about the
status of the title."6 1 The one exception to this principle is the
Torrens system of property records, which only a handful of
states currently use.62 Under the Torrens system, the govern-
ment maintains official certificates-Torrens certificates-that
definitively establish the state of title for a property.6 3 A Tor-
rens certificate typically includes a legal description, the names
of the property's owners, and a list of all documents affecting
the property.6 There are also many interests outside of proper-
ty recording systems that affect real estate: notably judgment
liens, mechanics liens, and probate proceedings.65
B. ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAMS
The first address confidentiality program designed to pro-
tect victims of domestic abuse was enacted by the Washington
State Legislature in 1991.66 Recognizing that victims of domes-
tic violence often leave their homes to escape their attackers,
the Washington Legislature developed a program that would
59. See Rose, supra note 30 ("[T]he Anglo-American recording system in
fact has been a saga of frustrated efforts to make clear who has what in land
transfers."); Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 207-11.
60. Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 228 (1999).
61. Id.
62. Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolv-
ing American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 673
(2003) [hereinafter Szypszak, Public Registries] (noting that while twenty
states instituted a Torrens system of land registration, half have now repealed
their statutes).
63. Id. at 670-72.
64. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 508.35 (2013) (specifying the form of the Min-
nesota Torrens certificate); In re Morgeson, 371 B.R. 798, 802 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2007) ("Under the Torrens system, the owners of registered land are issued a
certificate of title, which contains a description of the registered parcel, along
with memorials noting all liens, encumbrances and charges that bind the
land.").
65. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 210 (explaining the
effect of judgment liens, mechanics liens, tax liens, environmental liens, and
probate proceedings on real property).
66. See 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 228-35; Even, supra note 9.
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provide participants a substitute address.6 ' The Secretary of
State maintains the substitute address and forwards mail to
the participant, thus keeping his or her location confidential. 68
Initially the protections were only available to victims of do-
mestic violence, 69 but the program now accepts victims of sexual
assault, trafficking, and stalking as well.70
Domestic violence and stalking continue to be a major
problem for communities across the country.1 The CDC esti-
mates that nearly a quarter of women "experienced at least one
act of severe physical violence by an intimate partner during
their lifetimes," with significant numbers of women reporting
that they had been hit or thrown against something. Tragical-
ly, nearly 9% of women are estimated to have been raped by an
intimate partner and over 15% subjected to other forms of sex-
ual violence. In addition, nearly half of female victims "experi-
enced at least one act of psychological aggression by an inti-
mate partner during their lifetimes."74 While fewer women have
been affected by stalking than domestic violence, "an estimated
15.2% of women ... have experienced stalking during their life-
times that made them feel very fearful or made them believe
that they or someone close to them would be harmed or
killed."
67. See 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 228-35 ("The legislature finds that per-
sons attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence fre-
quently establish new addresses in order to prevent their assailants ... from
finding them."); Even, supra note 9 (describing the mechanism by which the
program protects participants' addresses). The substitute addresses were used
for "drivers' licenses, library cards, public utility billings, birth records, traffic
tickets, parking tickets, motor vehicle registrations, . . . employment security,
worker's compensation, . . . school/college records, state loans/grants, court ac-
tions against their abuser, and other court and governmental records." Id. at
529.
68. Even, supra note 9. The protections of the Washington statute also
provided confidentiality for otherwise public voting and marriage records. See
id. at 537-39.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 40.24.30(1)(a) (1991).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 40.24.30(1)(a)(i) (2014).
71. See generally Matthew J. Breiding et al., Ctrs. For Disease Control &
Prevention, Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and
Intimate Partner Violence Victimization-National Intimate Partner and Sex-
ual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP., 2014, at 1, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf.
72. Id. at 9 (estimating the number of women who had experienced at
least one act of severe physical violence to be 22.3%).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10 (estimating the number to be 47.1% of women).
75. Id. at 6. Stalkers engage in a wide range of concerning activity, but
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While there are several courses of action available to wom-
en who are victims of domestic violence or stalking, in some
cases the only way to end the abuse or stalking is to escape.9 In
1995, Joan Zorza, the founding editor of Domestic Violence Re-
port" and Sexual Assault Report,7 8 wrote that "most of battered
women's attempts to extricate themselves from abusive rela-
tionships are not adequately supported by police, courts, or leg-
islators." Since 1991, over thirty state legislatures have rec-
ognized that need and adopted address confidentiality
programs to help victims of domestic violence escape their abu-
sive situations." Since their adoption, address confidentiality
programs across the country have served and continue to serve
thousands of individuals, including over 7,000 in California
since 1999," and currently around 2,000 in Minnesota,8 2 990 in
North Carolina, and 2,500 in Colorado."
Unfortunately, abusers who are determined to track their
victims have a number of resources at their disposal, including
the most prevalent actions include: approaching their victims at the victims'
home or work, leaving text and voice messages, videotaping their victims, and
even tracking them through the use of GPS. Id. at 8.
76. Kristen M. Driskell, Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Do-
mestic Violence, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 130 (2009).
77. See 1 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 2 (1995) (listing Joan Zorza as editor
of the first volume).
78. Sexual Assault Report, CIVIC RESEARCH INST., http://www
.civicresearchinstitute.com/sar.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
79. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiali-
ty Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 280 (1995).
80. See Shiemke, supra note 11, at 37 (writing in 2011 that "[tihirty-two
states have passed laws establishing address confidentiality programs to help
domestic violence victims who need to relocate and keep their location confi-
dential"); Address Confidentiality Programs, supra note 11 (providing a list of
each state with an address confidentiality program). On January 1, 2016, Iowa
became the thirty-fourth state to institute an address confidentiality program.
Press Release, Office of the Iowa Sec'y of State, Applications Now Accepted for
Safe at Home; Statewide Program Launches Jan. 1 (Dec. 21, 2015), https://
sos.iowa.gov/news/2015 12_21.html.
81. Safe at Home, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/
registries/safe-home (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
82. See Joni Astrup, Secretary of State Simon Talks with Local Chamber,
STAR NEWS (June 25, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://erstarnews.com/2015/06/25/
secretary-of-state-talks-with-local-chamber.
83. Address Confidentiality Program, N.C. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.ncdoj.gov/Help-for-Victims/Domestic-Violence-Victims/Address
-Confidentiality-Program.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
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school, medical, postal service, department of motor vehicle,
and voter registration records." Not all states with address con-
fidentiality programs offer the same degree of protection
against such dangers." Moreover, under many statutes a vic-
tim's address is not protected when the victim transfers real es-
tate and records documents in the county land records . The
lack of confidentiality for county land records in most address
protection statutes exposes program participants to a great risk
of being discovered. Often victims of domestic violence are
forced to leave their homes to escape abuse and have to find
another place to live." Yet, under most address confidentiality
statutes, victims cannot purchase real estate without exposing
their information in the county land records.89
Even in states where address confidentiality programs may
be limited in scope, the programs complement a number of oth-
er resources available to victims of domestic violence.90 States
often have domestic violence shelters where victims of domestic
abuse can stay, and these shelters will often keep their loca-
tions confidential.9' In addition, non-profit organizations often
have programs that provide counseling, 24-hour hotlines, and
advocacy for victims of domestic violence.92
85. See Zorza, supra note 79, at 283-89.
86. See Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, supra note 12 (providing
an overview of the programs offered by each state). Rhode Island only provides
confidential voter registration, 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-28-1 (2013), and re-
quires a restraining order or no contact order to qualify, id. § 17-28-2(c). In
contrast, Arizona provides a substitute address, confidential motor registra-
tion and voter registration, county assessor and treasurer confidentiality and
county recorder confidentiality. Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, supra
note 12.
87. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-2108 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-
8(h) (2015).
88. Driskell, supra note 76 ("[E]scape and establishment of a new identity
may be the only way for some victims of domestic violence to break free from
the cycle of abuse.").
89. If the victim wishes to receive the protections of the recording act in
her state, she must record, but most states do not include real property rec-
ords within the protections of their address confidentiality programs. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-2108; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-8(h).
90. See, e.g., Kellie Wingate Campell, Victim Confidentiality Laws Pro-
mote Safety and Dignity, 69 J. MO. B. 76, 77-81 (2013) (explaining resources
available to victims in Missouri: redaction of information from court records,
confidentiality for domestic violence shelters and rape centers, and an address
confidentiality program).
91. See, e.g., Zorza, supra note 79, at 282 (discussing the importance of
keeping addresses of shelters for battered women confidential).
92. See Lips, supra note 1.
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C. How Do ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAMS APPLY TO
REAL ESTATE RECORDS?
Most address confidentiality programs across the United
States stop short of protecting real estate conveyances involv-
ing victims of domestic abuse." Minnesota's Safe at Home pro-
gram, however, illustrates how address confidentiality pro-
grams can protect the real property records of program
participants." The Minnesota State Legislature established its
Safe at Home program in 2006 to protect victims of domestic
violence, sexual assault, and stalking from being found by their
assailants. The program initially provided participants with
voter registration confidentiality and a substitute address,
which they can present to "any person." 96 The legislation was
very successful, serving over 2,000 people in the first six years
of the program. As of 2012, the participants were largely chil-
98dren and adult women.
In 2013, the Minnesota Legislature voted to increase the
program's protections." The amendment allows a participant to
submit a notice that the individual is certified in the program
to any government entity.100 Consequently, any of that individ-
ual's "identity and location data" held by the entity cannot "be
shared with any other government entity, or disseminated to
any person."'o' Though no one considered it at the time, this
provision had serious ramifications for Minnesota's recording
system. 102 If a program participant were to submit a notice to a
county recorder, the recorder would not be able to disclose the
name, legal description, or address information on a recorded
document that involved the individual.
93. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-2108; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-8(h).
94. MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.01-.13, 13.045 (Supp. 2015); MINN. R. 8290.0100-
.1500 (2015).
95. 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 242.
96. Id. § 5 (use of substitute address), § 6 (voter registration confidentiali-
ty).
97. See Ruben Rosario, To Keep These Victims at Home, Keep Their Homes
Secret, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.twincities.com/2013/03/30/
ruben-rosario-to-keep-these-victims-at-home-keep-their-homes-secret.
98. Id.
99. 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 76.
100. Id. § 6.
101. Id. "'[Ildentity and location data' means any data that may be used to
identify or physically locate a program participant . . . ." Id.
102. Audio Recording: Committee Hearing of the Committee on Civil Law,
held by the Minn. House of Representatives (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www
.house.leg.state.mn.us/audiomp31s88/civil03261 4 .mp3.
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To address this problem, individuals from the office of the
Secretary of State, the Hennepin County Examiner of Titles,
the Minnesota Land Title Association, the Minnesota County
Recorders Association, and the Hennepin County Bar Associa-
tion worked to develop a new amendment, which they present-
ed in early 2014.103 The new amendment added a special notice
requirement specifically for participants who want their confi-
dentiality to extend to real property records.'04 In addition, the
amendment allows county recorders to include name infor-
mation alone in the grantor-grantee index for property records,
and the property information alone in the tract index.'05 As a
result, parties searching either index will find documents in-
volving the protected individual, but they will have to request
the complete documents directly from the secretary of state.06
Significantly, the new amendment provides, "[n]otice that a
document or certificate is private and viewable only" upon re-
quest from the secretary of state "is deemed constructive notice
of the document or [Torrens] certificate.' 0 o
The Minnesota Safe at Home statute represents a positive
step toward protections that will allow victims of domestic vio-
lence and stalking to gain new independence by purchasing
property. The series of amendments to the statute, however,
show the problems involved in expanding address confidentiali-
ty programs to include real property. As the next Part of this
Note will demonstrate, Minnesota's recently expanded Safe at
Home program offers a helpful template for other states that
wish to better protect vulnerable individuals. Before any state
applies that template, its legislature should modify the statute
to include more thorough protections for program participants
and more effective access for authorized parties.
103. See Meeting Minutes of Committee on Civil Law, MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cmte/
minutes/minutes.aspx?comm=88003&id=5555&lsyear=88.
104. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 173, § 2, subdiv. 2.





II. CURRENT ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY STATUTES
DO NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT AT-RISK INDIVIDUALS
AND IMPOSE UNNECESSARILY SEVERE BURDENS ON
REAL PROPERTY RECORDS SYSTEMS
Both real estate records systems and address confidentiali-
ty programs protect important public interests. Because the in-
clusion of real estate records in the protections of address con-
fidentiality programs is a very recent development, it is
important to evaluate whether current legislative schemes ad-
equately protect these two interests and what steps can be tak-
en to ensure better protections in the future. This Part consid-
ers the benefits and shortcomings of expanding address confi-
dentiality programs to include real property records as a way to
protect victims of domestic violence, abuse, and stalking from
those who use public records to pursue them. Section A exam-
ines the tension between protecting victims of abuse and main-
taining the integrity of land records. Section B discusses the
advantages currently afforded by address confidentiality
programs that include real property records. Section C ad-
dresses significant problems with current statutes, specifically
in providing (1) deficient protections for program participants
and (2) overbroad restrictions on recording systems. This Part
concludes that while statutes like Minnesota's Safe at Home
statute provide beneficial protections to victims of abuse, they
do not sufficiently protect program participants in real estate
matters, and they fail to adequately provide for the interests of
real property recording systems.
A. THE IDENTITY PROTECTION OBJECTIVE OF ADDRESS
CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAMS UNDERMINES THE NOTICE
FUNCTION OF REAL PROPERTY RECORDS
There is an unavoidable conflict between the goals of ad-
dress confidentiality programs and those of property recording
systems. When location and identity information are sup-
pressed in real estate records, the consequences extend beyond
just program participants. Any attempt to lessen these external
effects, however, will weaken protections for victims. By mak-
ing concessions that balance the interests of address confiden-
tiality programs with those of real estate recording systems,
legislators can secure the most important elements of each.
This Section will detail the issues involved when address confi-
dentiality programs expand to include real property records. It
will also discuss possible approaches to resolving these issues
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while still protecting the essential interests of both address
confidentiality programs and real estate records systems.
1. Problems Involved When Legislatures Apply Address
Confidentiality Programs to Real Estate Records
The primary purpose of address confidentiality programs is
to protect the location of victims of domestic abuse, sexual as-
sault, and stalking from those who attempt to find and harm
them.10 Many programs accomplish this by issuing substitute
addresses for participants to use in place of their residence ad-
dresses.109 This method works for most of the situations in
which a person might disclose their location information. In
some cases, though, information about an individual's location
can be communicated in other forms. Most people are familiar
with GPS as a means of identifying a specific point on the
earth's surface. Land records do not yet use GPS coordinates to
fix boundaries, but the section-township-range or lot and block
designations of most legal descriptions can narrow down a loca-
tion to a very small and very specific area.1 o Parcel numbers
are equally precise and are often used for tax, and occasionallyd. 111
recording, purposes.
The substitute address approach of many address confiden-
tiality programs will not affect this type of location data, be-
cause it is not expressed as a mailing address. In fact, some
property locations may not even have mailing addresses. When,
however, an address confidentiality program seeks to protect
not only address information but location information general-
ly, it impacts these other types of location data as well, because
they are all then included within the program's scope. Such an
expansion of protections (1) raises concerns about all property
in a given county; (2) impacts the priority of conveyances; and
108. See MINN. STAT. § 5B.01 (Supp. 2015); Even, supra note 9.
109. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 5B.05; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-6 (West 2014);
Even, supra, note 9.
110. See ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A
NUTSHELL 325-28 (6th ed. 2010) (describing several different forms of legal
descriptions).
111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-252 (2015) ("Circuit court clerks in those
localities with a unique parcel identification system shall require that any
deed . . . bear, on the first page of the deed or other instrument, or state in the
cover sheet submitted with the deed or other instrument, the tax map refer-
ence number or numbers, or the parcel identification number (PIN) or num-
bers, of the affected parcel or parcels.").
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(3) even affects government-provided certificates of ownership.
This Subsection will examine each of these issues in turn.
a. Clouds on Title
When address confidentiality programs attempt to protect
all of the different types of location data connected to partici-
pants, they have a significant effect on local property interests.
In addition to the property interests of those enrolled in the
program, this expanded scope has an effect on every property
owner in the counties where enrollees reside. Unlike other pub-
lic records in which individuals provide certain information to
the government, property records are intended for the use and
benefit of the general public."'
When a program participant purchases, sells, mortgages,
or otherwise disposes of a property interest and can require the
county recorder not to reveal the location of the property, the
document offers very little helpful information to others in that
county. People can learn who granted or received the property,
but they do not know where exactly the property is located.
Minnesota's statute prior to its amendment obscured even more
information in participants' property records.113 In addition to
prohibiting county recorders from revealing location infor-
mation, the statute also barred the release of identity infor-
mation, including names."' As a result, the only thing a mem-
ber of the public could learn is that some unknown person sold
some unknown property somewhere in the county, though even
the fact that it is within the county might not be verifiable."'
In addition to providing no information about what proper-
ty interests the individual conveyed or received, the lack of lo-
cation information creates a risk for every piece of property
within the county. Because there is no way to know the location
without a legal description, any later buyer or mortgagee has to
112. See Scheid, supra note 15, at 101; Szypszak, North Carolina, supra
note 15 (explaining that public notice of interests affecting real property is an
important goal of recording statutes and the real property records); see also
Charles Szypszak, Real Estate Records, the Captive Public, and Opportunities
for the Public Good, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 5, 5 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Szypszak,
Real Estate Records] ("Public records provide those who acquire real estate in-
terests with a means of giving public notice of their rights.").
113. See MINN. STAT. § 13.045 (Supp. 2015).
114. Id. at subdiv. 3 ("[Plrivate or confidential location data on a program
participant who submits a notice ... may not be shared with any other gov-
ernment entity or nongovernmental entity . . .
115. See id.
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assume the worst and account for the risk that the property
they are interested in may be affected.H6 This cloud on the title
of every property in the county will reduce the marketability of
all properties in the county, making the land less valuable.117
When one participant can have this type of effect on an entire
county, the risk will only increase as more participants engage
in more conveyances.
b. Recording Issues
Protecting all location information will also have a signifi-
cant effect on the property interests of program participants
themselves. The most effective way to avoid having one's name
and location information in the property records after purchas-
ing property is never to record the documents involved in the
transaction. In general, this does not make the conveyance in-
valid or deprive the recipient of any interest in the property."
A problem arises, however, as a result of the recording acts
each state has enacted." 9 If the grantor were later to give the
same interest to someone else who did opt to record, the origi-
nal grantee would have received nothing.120 It is unlikely any-
one would accept the substantial risk of losing a house or land
by deciding not to record. As a result, any address confidentiali-
ty program that seeks to enable victims of domestic violence to
relocate by purchasing property should be careful to protect lo-
116. If a document has been recorded in a certain county but has a redact-
ed legal description, there is no way to determine what property the document
affects. It could relate to any piece of property in the county, or it might not
even be for a property in the county.
117. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 211 ("[Mlaking the
public records a more reliable indication of ownership ... improved the mar-
ketability of North Carolina real estate.").
118. See HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, 5 THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1262 (Basil Jones ed., 3d ed. 1939) ("[A] failure to record the instrument in
no way affects the passing of title as between the parties thereto."). There are,
however, a small number of jurisdictions in which a deed must be recorded to
effectively transfer title. See id. § 1262 & nn.40, 40.10 (Supp. 2015).
119. See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 112, at 7 ("Although
real estate law is fundamentally the same across the United States, individual
state laws govern. . . .").
120. Whether in a race, race-notice, or notice state, the subsequent pur-
chaser would have priority over the victim who did not record. In a race state,
he would have recorded first and thus would have met the requirement to
have priority. In a notice state, he would have recorded without notice of the
victim's purchase, thus obtaining priority over the victim's interest. And final-
ly, in a race-notice state, he would have recorded first and without notice of
the previous purchaser's interest, therefore he would have priority.
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cation information in the property records in such a way that
participants receive the protection of the state's recording act.
A program that requires recorders to redact location infor-
mation will have a far greater impact in notice and race-notice
states than it will in pure race states. In race jurisdictions, the
lack of a legal description viewable by the general public will
not affect conveyance priority; all that matters is that the doc-
ument is recorded before those from any other transfer of the
property.12' This still presents a cloud on the title of all other
property in the county, but the program participant is at least
able to record his or her conveyance document and take ad-
vantage of the protections of the recording statute. Because on-
ly a few states have pure race statutes, the more important
outcome is what happens for a program participant under no-
tice or race-notice recording acts.12
In a pure notice jurisdiction, any subsequent purchaser
must take the property without notice of any earlier claims in
order to have priority over those claims.'2 3 Recording a docu-
ment will generally give a grantee strong protection against
later claims, since any recorded document is generally consid-
ered to provide constructive notice of its contents.124 Redacting a
document or preventing the public from viewing a document,
however, causes problems for this idea of notice. If a buyer ex-
amining title cannot search for or read a legal description in-
volving the property he is trying to examine, he cannot know
what property that document affects and cannot have notice of
the conveyance. As a result, that buyer will satisfy the record-
ing act's requirement that he not have notice of the prior claim,
and he may be able to gain priority despite the program partic-
ipant's recording.1 25 Actual notice will certainly not exist, be-
cause the buyer has not been able to see what property is af-
fected and can likely not even find the document.126
Constructive notice may also be a problem, since the buyer
could not have found the information through a reasonable
search of the real estate records.' 7 Without anything to point
121. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 92.08(a).
122. See id. (only three states employ race recording acts).
123. See id. § 92.08(b)-(c).
124. Id. § 92.09(c).
125. See id. § 92.08(b) (explaining the operation of notice recording acts).
126. "Actual notice" is "notice from the subsequent purchaser's actual
knowledge of the prior interest." Id. § 92.09(c).
127. "Constructive notice" deems a subsequent purchaser "to have notice of
all facts that ... a reasonable title search of the public real estate records
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the buyer to the document, he cannot be responsible for know-
ing what it contains.
A race-notice recording act raises many of the same con-
cerns. Yet in a race-notice jurisdiction a program participant is
better protected. A redacted document still provides no notice
to a later purchaser, which satisfies one requirement to obtain
priority, but any later purchaser must also record first.12 ' To
benefit from a race-notice statute, therefore, a participant must
record before any subsequent purchaser, because she will have
no means of providing notice after the conveyance document is
suppressed.
If address confidentiality programs wish to protect partici-
pants more effectively, they must find a way to provide third
parties with notice while still restricting the actual location in-
formation of the individual enrolled in the program. How re-
corders index and make such documents viewable will signifi-
cantly affect what type of notice other parties receive and, as a
result, how successful transaction documents will be in trans-
ferring property interests when at least one is a participant in
a state address confidentiality program. If documents can be
indexed in such a way that a search will indicate a certain legal
description is affected by the program, parties would at least
have notice that further inquiry is necessary. 29 This construc-
tive notice would protect program participants by fulfilling the
notice requirements of a recording statute. Such a structure
would also protect buyers by informing them of potential inter-
ests affecting the properties in which they are interested.
c. Torrens Registration System
While not many states employ a Torrens registration sys-
tem for property,13 ' an address confidentiality program that
seeks to include land records in those few states will have to
address the information included on Torrens certificates in ad-
dition to that contained in indices and recorded documents. Be-
cause Torrens certificates list all documents currently affecting
would have revealed." Id.
128. See id.
129. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 224 (referencing a
South Carolina Supreme Court decision holding that a document "binds a pur-
chaser only 'if enough is disclosed by the index to put a careful and prudent
examiner upon inquiry, and if upon such inquiry the instrument would be
found'" (quoting Dorman v. Goodman, 196 S.E. 352, 355 (N.C. 1938))).
130. See Szypszak, Public Registries, supra note 62 (noting that only about
ten states still employ a Torrens system for land registration).
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a property, merely redacting the legal description on the certifi-
cate will not protect the owner."' Anyone can pull up past doc-
uments memorialized on the certificate and see what land they
affect. To address this issue, any index providing the name of
the owner would have to indicate only that the individual held
property covered by a Torrens certificate. Likewise a search for
a specific legal description should be limited to say that such a
property was registered under the Torrens system. If a search-
er were able to access a certificate, even with the owner's name
redacted, it is likely there would be recent documents executed
by the owner listed on the certificate. As a result, anyone exam-
ining the certificate could likely discover the current owner.
Even if access to the certificate itself is blocked, any searcher
would have notice, but he would have to submit a request for
further information about the records in order to see the details
of the certificate.
2. Available Approaches To Address the Conflict Between
Protecting Program Participants and Maintaining the Stability
of the Land Records
Given the opposing goals of address confidentiality pro-
grams and real property records, no solution will be able to ful-
ly satisfy the objectives of both. As in many other areas of the
law, legislatures must look for a balance. Of course, the address
confidentiality programs of nearly all states do not currently
protect participants' information in property records.1 32 By re-
fraining from doing so, legislatures maintain the stability of the
land records system in their states. Yet at the same time, those
legislatures allow difficulties to continue for victims of domestic
violence or stalking who attempt to escape by relocating and
purchasing a home.
An alternative is to formulate an approach, as Minnesota
has done, that secures the most important aspects of both vic-
tim protection through confidentiality and certainty of property
rights through public property records.3 " An approach that bal-
ances the most important elements of each system will require
concessions, but there is precedent for that on both sides. Most
address confidentiality programs allow disclosure of address or
131. See In re Morgeson, 371 B.R. 798, 802 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (describ-
ing the contents of a certificate of title).
132. See Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, supra note 12.
133. MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.01-.12, 13.045 (Supp. 2015); MINN. R. 8290.0100-
.1500 (2015).
2596 [ 100:2577
2016] CONFIDENTIALITY AND REAL PROPERTY
location information to law enforcement, by court order, and, in
134
some situations, for child custody cases. These exceptions
show a willingness to compromise program participant confi-
dentiality in favor of other important interests. Maintaining
the integrity of the land records system is certainly a signifi-
cant interest, especially because it benefits program partici-
pants as well.
Property records systems have made similar concessions.
There are a number of interests that cannot be found by
searching recorded documents . 1 3 These interests do, however,
still affect property, and parties must account for them when
participating in real estate transactions.'36 While the common
exceptions to recording acts do not involve redacted or limited
information in documents that have been recorded, such
changes would not impede the overall functioning of states' re-
cording systems. The number and impact of program partici-
pants is likely to be small, so a system that accounts for loca-
tion confidentiality will likely not detract strongly from the
goals of current property records.
B. CURRENT STATUTES ALLOW PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS To
RELOCATE WHILE PROVIDING FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION
OF REAL PROPERTY RECORDS SYSTEMS
Because Minnesota's Safe at Home program grants broader
protections than those of other states, this Section will start
with Minnesota's statute as a model and examine the benefits
of the program. Specifically, this Section will analyze what por-
tions of the Minnesota statute successfully support the inter-
ests of the real estate system and the state's Safe at Home pro-
gram and, as a result, should be followed by other states
looking to expand the protections of their address confidentiali-
ty programs to real property records.
134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.045, subdiv. 3 (court order and law en-
forcement); Falconi v. Sec'y of State of Nev., 299 P.3d 378, 380 (Nev. 2013)
("[T]he rights of a custodial parent to know where his or her child resides must
be balanced against the important state interest in protecting victims of do-
mestic violence served by the state's fictitious address program.").
135. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 210 (explaining the
effect of judgment liens, mechanics liens, tax liens, environmental liens, and
probate proceedings on real property).
136. Id.
137. In an article from 2013, Minnesota's Safe at Home program was re-
ported to have provided protection for over 2,000 participants. Rosario, supra
note 97. It reported that at "the end of 2012, roughly 1,215 .. . are enrolled in
518 households across the state." Id.
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1. Benefits for At-Risk Individuals
The greatest benefit Minnesota's program provides to those
who have been victims of domestic abuse or stalking is the abil-
ity to protect not just their personal addresses but all infor-
mation related to their location." 8 As noted previously, there
are a number of different types of information that might dis-
close the location of an individual enrolled in an address confi-
dentiality program. Most situations involve a victim's postal
address, and Minnesota allows, as do many other states, partic-
ipants to use a substitute address.3 9 Minnesota also allows par-
ticipants to protect their location even in cases where other
types of location data are required. 40 In these instances, vic-
tims must still provide the data, but government agencies are
required to keep that information confidential. 4 '
As a result of the broad scope of Minnesota's Safe at Home
program, participants can purchase and finance their own
homes without the risk of their abusers discovering their loca-
tion through the documents recorded as part of the transac-
tion.1 4 2 This ability offers a much better option than the alter-
natives and fulfills the purpose stated in the name of the
program by allowing participants to be safe in their homes.
Without a provision protecting location information in
property records, victims of domestic violence face substantial
risk in purchasing a home and exposing their location to their
abusers. As discussed above, one option is to purchase a house
but never record the conveyance documents. This approach pro-
tects individuals from being found, but it also exposes them to
the risk that their conveyance may later be superseded if an-
other party purchases the same interest and does record. An-
other option might be for the individual to find a third party to
purchase and hold the house for her. This alternative still holds
substantial risk for the victim, who must trust the third party
to act in the victim's best interest. A victim is more likely to
trust someone familiar, like a relative or close friend; although
anyone determined to track the victim will likely know the per-
138. See MINN. STAT. § 13.045 (Supp. 2015).
139. Id. § 5B.05(a).
140. Id. § 13.045.
141. Id. at subdiv. 2.
142. See id. at subdiv. 4a(a) (requiring that recorded documents not be dis-
played in such a way that location and identity information are both viewable
at the same time).
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son's friends and family and would be able to find any convey-
ance by those parties as well.
Another potential approach is for a victim to change his or
her name and social security number.' By changing this in-
formation, no documents recorded to finalize a home purchase
will alert abusers or stalkers to the victim's location, because
they will not know to look for the victim's new name and social
security number. Another consequence of the name change,
however, is that the victim will lose all work and credit histo-
ry." As a result, the individual will find it difficult to obtain fi-
nancing for the property."' This method does effectively hide
the victim from pursuers, but it also severely handicaps the
person's ability to carry on with his or her life.
Another similar alternative is for the victim to form a legal
entity, such as an LLC or an S corporation, through which she
can purchase property and obtain financing. This option
achieves the desired protection by hiding the identity of the
owner in any transactions. On the other hand, it exposes the
individual to additional costs. It may be difficult to obtain a
loan on favorable terms for the entity, legal counsel may be re-
quired to set up the entity, and the entity must pay formation
and filing fees. 146 These added costs and extra steps likely pro-
hibit most victims from pursuing this option when purchasing a
home.'4 7 In addition, the name of the victim may still be con-
143. See Driskell, supra note 76.
144. The Cost and Impact of Crime: Understanding the Financial and Hu-
man Impact of Criminal Activity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 8-9 (2006) (statement of Mary Lou Leary, Executive Director,
National Center for Victims of Crime).
145. While it may be particularly difficult to obtain a traditional mortgage
loan, the FHA will still underwrite loans for those who have limited or no
credit histories. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 4155.1, MORT-
GAGE CREDIT ANALYSIS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE ch. 4 § C.1.d (2011),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/administration/
hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4155.1 ("The lack of a credit history, or the borrow-
er's decision to not use credit, may not be used as the basis for rejecting the
loan application. Some prospective borrowers may not have an established
credit history. For these borrowers ... the lender must obtain a non-
traditional merged credit report (NTMCR) from a credit reporting company, or
develop a credit history from [other sources] . . . ." (emphasis in original)).
146. Filing fees in Minnesota, for example, for a corporation or an LLC are
at least $135. Business Filing Fee Schedule, OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC'Y OF
STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid
=4148 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
147. See Margaret F. Brown, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure to Li-
ability for Engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 279, 286 (2001) ("Many victims of domestic violence are financial-
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nected to the business through the formation documents or an-
nual filings.1 4" As a result, there may be an additional risk con-
nected with this alternative.
Without a program that protects a program participant's
location information in the real property records, there are no
strong options for a victim of domestic violence to purchase a
new home. The only remaining alternatives are those that do
not involve owning a home. Victims can live with relatives or
friends, stay in a domestic violence shelter, or lease an apart-
ment or house. These may provide sufficient long-term solu-
tions for some individuals, but they do not provide the long-
term benefit and independence of owning a home.149 Extending
the protection of address confidentiality programs to real prop-
erty records will allow a more achievable alternative for indi-
viduals looking to reestablish their independence and provide a
permanent home safe from their abusers.
2. Protections for Property Records
Despite the confidentiality required by Minnesota's Safe at
Home program, the legislature included several provisions in
the amended statute that protect the function of the state's real
property records. First, the amendment makes an exception to
its general rule that government entities cannot disclose identi-
ty information or location information.'"0 The amendment al-
lows county recorders to release separately the location infor-
mation and identity information of program participants."s"
ly dependent on their abusers and cannot afford an attorney."); Michele Gil-
man, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to Eco-
nomic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 403 ("[Dlomestic violence victims
are disproportionately poor.").
148. In some states, it is possible to do a simple name search to discover
information about an entity's registered address, its officers, and even the of-
ficers' addresses. See, e.g., Business Name Search, IN.GOv, https://secure.in
.gov/sos/online corps/namesearch.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). Even if
the documents are not available online, it is often possible to order copies for a
nominal fee. See, e.g., Search Business Filings, MINN. Bus. & LIEN SYS.,
https://mblsportal.sos.state.mn.us/Business/Search (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
149. See CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT & ERIC S. BELSKY, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS.
& URBAN DEV., THE HOMEOWNERSHIP EXPERIENCE OF Low-INCOME AND MI-
NORITY FAMILIES 3-6 (2006), http://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/hisp
homeown9.pdf (describing benefits of homeownership).
150. MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.05, 13.045 (Supp. 2015); 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 173,
§ 2 (effective Apr. 30, 2014).
151. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 173, § 2.
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Most states index documents submitted for recording in
two different places 5 2: the tract index references documents
based on the parcels they affect. and the grantor-grantee in-
dex lists documents by reference to the parties who executed
the documents.154 Often the tract index will include the names
of the grantor and grantee for a conveyance."5 Under the recent
amendment to the Minnesota Safe at Home statute, however,
the name of a program participant cannot be listed with the lo-
cation information in the tract index. 56
This makes the tract index less helpful, but it still allows
the tract index to provide notice if there is a conveyance affect-
ing a specific property. By allowing a conveyance to still be in-
dexed to a specific parcel, the Minnesota Safe at Home statute
avoids creating a cloud on the title of other properties in the
county. The amendment also ensures that program partici-
pants receive the protection of the recording act, since anyone
searching for documents affecting a specific property will at
least have notice that there is a document affecting that prop-
erty.15 7
The amendment also structured the Minnesota Safe at
Home statute to allow recorders to list the name of the program
participant in the grantor-grantee index, though no legal de-
scription can be included.' This also accommodates the notice
goal of the property recording system. Anyone looking to buy
property from a protected person can see whether or not that
individual has conveyed any interests in the property by look-
ing at the grantor index. 59 Even though a buyer will need to see
the document to know what property is affected, the buyer will
152. 14 POWELL, supra note 19, § 82.03[2].
153. Id. § 82.03[21 [c].
154. Id. § 82.03 [21 [b].
155. Id. § 82.03 [2] [c].
156. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 173, § 2 (clarifying that a county recorder can
release a participant's name and substitute address if they "are not disclosed
in conjunction with location data").
157. See id. ("The procedures must provide public notice of the existence of
recorded documents and certificates of title that are not publicly viewable and
the provisions for viewing them under this subdivision. Notice that a docu-
ment or certificate is private and viewable only under this subdivision or sub-
division 4b is deemed constructive notice of the document or certificate.").
158. See id. ("This subdivision does not prevent the public disclosure of the
participant's name and address designated under chapter 5B in the county re-
ception index if the participant's name and designated address are not dis-




receive notice that further inquiry is required.'6 0 This arrange-
ment also protects victims who own property, because it does
not reveal any information about their location. At most, a
stalker could discover that his victim lived in a particular coun-
ty, but he would not be able to determine his victim's location
with any further specificity. As a result of the discrete elements
of the conveyance in each index, parties can find a name asso-
ciated with a transfer in one location and an address with some
transaction in another, but there is no way to tie the two to-
gether. A scheme such as this is able to address the notice and
priority concerns involved with the property recording system
while preserving the confidentiality of a victim's location. ,
Another strength of Minnesota's statute is the flexibility it
affords recorders' offices across the state in carrying out the re-
quirements of the statute.161 Due to the novel inclusion of real
estate records in the address confidentiality program, there is
no standard for maintaining a system to track what documents
have been redacted or made unavailable and to ensure that
those documents are made available when the participant is no
longer entitled to the program's protections. Because the bur-
den of administering the program's effects on the real estate
records in each county falls on the recorders, 62 permitting each
recorder's office to determine the best way to implement the
statute will allow them to remain focused on carrying out their
primary task of making real estate records available to the pub-
lic.
In addition, Minnesota's statute provides an example of a
reasonable exception to the confidentiality of program partici-
pants. The statute allows certain persons to contact the secre-
tary of state to request information regarding redacted or
unviewable documents.'6 3 This is a particularly important ex-
ception because it allows third parties to better determine the
state of title for a property. Those who have legitimate interests
in knowing the precise state of a property-lenders or title in-
surers, for instance-pose no risk to victims of domestic abuse.
Hindering the efforts of such entities may actually have a nega-
160. Id.
161. Id. ("Each county recorder shall establish procedures for recording or
filing documents to comply with this subdivision.").
162. See id.
163. Id. ("Upon request, the secretary of state may share data regarding a
program participant's real property records for the purpose of confirming or
denying that the program participant's real property is the property subject to
a bona fide title examination.").
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tive impact on program participants if it prevents participants
from obtaining financing or selling their properties. Providing a
mechanism for accessing protected documents enables the
property records system to operate as it was intended and pro-
vide outside parties with an accurate picture of matters affect-
ing a given property.
C. CURRENT PROGRAMS FAIL To ADEQUATELY PROTECT
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE AND IMPOSE SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON
RECORDING SYSTEMS
Minnesota's Safe at Home statute provides a strong start-
ing point for legislatures that want to expand their address
confidentiality programs to protect victims of domestic violence
seeking to relocate. Even so, the program fails to achieve its
purpose in a number of critical respects. While the program of-
fers significant protections to participants by suppressing their
location information in county recording systems, it leaves open
several other avenues to find a participant who has purchased
property. Additionally, the program imposes heavy burdens on
county recorders and third parties who facilitate real estate
transactions.
1. Victims Seeking To Relocate by Purchasing a New Home
Are Not Fully Protected by Programs Like Minnesota's Safe at
Home Program
States looking to implement a system like Minnesota's Safe
at Home program should be aware of the current weaknesses of
the program. The goal of Minnesota's program-"to enable
state and local agencies to respond to requests for data without
disclosing the location of a victim of domestic violence, sexual
assault, or stalking"-suggests an intention to protect all types
of location information against disclosure. 6 4 The legislature
specifically identifies property records for protection and notes
that these records include "documents maintained in a public
recording system, data on assessments and taxation, and other
data on real property.,' To ensure that location information in
these records is suppressed, a participant must submit a real
estate notice to the county recorder. '6 The county recorder
must, in turn, send a copy of the notice to the person responsi-
164. MINN. STAT. § 5B.01 (Supp. 2015).




ble for the property tax records in that county, presumably so
that the county tax records do not show the name and location
information of the individual.' The statute only addresses,
however, what the county recorder can or cannot disclose.1 68 It
does not specify what other real estate records are affected and
how government entities must handle that information.
There are a number of systems beyond the county land rec-
ords that provide information on owners and property loca-
tions. The property tax records and assessment records noted
in the Minnesota statute are just two examples. 6 9 Counties of-
ten have geographic information systems (GIS) that combine a
number of different types of information about property in a
given county.170 These systems often include addresses, legal
descriptions, tax parcel numbers, property identification num-
bers, ownership information, and even information on the most
recent transfer of a property.' 7 ' In some counties, the public can
172
search these databases by owner name.
In addition to searching property tax records and GIS da-
tabases, abusers attempting to track down their victims can al-
so access information compiled from property sales disclosure
forms. A number of states require that parties conveying prop-
erty file a form disclosing the purchase price and other infor-
mation when they file their transaction documents with the
county recorder.'73 These forms can include the names and ad-
167. Id. at subdiv. 4a(b).
168. Id. ("[Tihe county recorder must not disclose the program participant's
identity data in conjunction with the property identified in the written notice
169. Id. at subdiv. 2(b).
170. Whitman, supra note 60, at 243-44 (describing the function of geo-
graphic information systems).
171. See, e.g., HENNEPIN INTERACTIVE MAPS, http://gis.hennepin.us/
Property/Map/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Hennepin County,
Minnesota GIS portal); RAMSEY COUNTY GIS USER GROUP, http://www
.ramseygis.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Ramsey County, Minnesota GIS
portal); RUSH COUNTY IN SEARCH, http://beacon.schneidercorp.com/
Application.aspx?Appld=470&Layerld=6610&PageTypeld=2&PagelD=3605
(last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Rush County, Indiana GIS portal).
172. See, e.g., COUNTY OF EL DORADO-GOTNET, http-/gem.edcgov
.us/gotnet (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (El Dorado County, California GIS por-
tal); CURRITUCK COUNTY GIS ONLINE MAPPING PROGRAM, http:l
currituckncgov.com/Freeance/Client/PublicAccess1/index.html?appconfig=
PublicGISViewer2013 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Currituck County, North
Carolina GIS platform that allows for name searches of property owners);
MAPINDY, http://maps.indy.gov/MapIndy (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Marion
County, Indiana GIS portal).
173. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-1.1-5.5 (2014) (mandating that parties to a re-
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dresses of the seller and buyer; the address, legal description,
or tax parcel information for the property; and financing infor-
mation. 17 4 In some states, any member of the public can easily
perform a name search to find a specific disclosure.'7 5 In other
states, even though the records are available to the public, an
individual attempting to perform a search must have some in-
formation about the property or transfer to find the relevant
record. 176
While the Minnesota statute represents a move in the right
direction, it falls short of its intended effect. Without address-
ing and specifying a method to deal with the other forms of lo-
cation information associated with real estate transfers, victims
who purchase property remain susceptible to discovery.
2. Minnesota's Safe at Home Statute Imposes Heavy Burdens
on Those Responsible for Maintaining and Examining the Real
Estate Records
Despite allowing recorders flexibility in implementing sys-
tems to address the requirements of Minnesota's program, the
extension of the Safe at Home program to include real property
records places significant burdens on county recorders. In addi-
tion to the normal duties of county recorders, the officials must
also follow the timelines of each real estate notice they receive
from program participants. Each real estate notice must be re-
submitted every time the program participant's certification is
renewed, which occurs every four years.' Recorders must have
a system by which they process the documents and real estate
notices of program participants, index the documents in such a
way that searchers receive notice of their existence, and track
the documents so that they can remove redactions and viewing
restrictions when a participant is no longer protected by the
program. ' Further, recorders must coordinate with the secre-
al estate conveyance file a sales disclosure form); MINN. STAT. § 272.115 (2015)
(requiring that a certificate of real estate value is filed for certain transfers of
real property).
174. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-1.1-5.5-5; MINN. STAT. § 272.115, subdiv. 1.
175. See, e.g., Sales Disclosure Form, IND. GATEWAY, http://gatewaysdf
.ifionline.org/Search.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (Indiana's sales disclo-
sure form search).
176. See, e.g., eCRV Electronic Certificate of Real Estate Value, MINN.
REVENUE, http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/CRV/Pages/eCRV.aspx (last visited
Apr. 17, 2016) (Minnesota's certificate of real estate value search).
177. See MINN. STAT. § 5B.03, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2015).
178. See id. § 13.045, subdiv. 4a(a).
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tary of state to process requests for documents and maintain
full copies of redacted or private documents to securely deliver
to authorized outside parties. 9
Any program structured like Minnesota's will also impose
burdens on outside parties who are regularly involved in real
estate transactions. This statute will have a great effect on title
insurance companies in particular."'o First, title insurance com-
panies face increased risk when documents are more difficult to
find. Requiring a modification of recorders' usual practices in
indexing documents creates another opportunity for recording
mistakes. Title insurance companies bear the risk on both sides
of any potential mistakes. If the title insurer cannot find a doc-
ument creating a certain interest, it will likely have to defend
its insured against that interest in court and may have to pay
out the value of the policy.'"' On the other hand, if the title in-
surance company is insuring a buyer who is a program partici-
pant and there is a mistake in the recording that allows anoth-
er purchaser to receive priority, the insurance company will
have to pay out the claim or defend against that interest.
In addition, title insurance companies face an increased
burden of having to contact the secretary of state to formally
request information about every affected document involved in
their searches.' When only small numbers of participants en-
gage in property transactions, this may not be a great burden.
But if more participants take advantage of the program's pro-
tections, this may become a large drain on the time and re-
sources of the title examiners of title insurance companies.
A more significant hurdle is the lack of a provision allow-
ing title examiners to access the documents themselves. The
statute states that "the secretary of state may respond by an
affirmation in writing that the property subject to the title ex-
amination is or is not the property subject to a program partici-
pant's real property notice."84 If it is not the property subject to
a notice, then the examiner need take no further action. If, on
179. Id. at subdiv. 4a(a)(3).
180. See Szypszak, Public Registries, supra note 62, at 683 (explaining that
title insurance has now become an indispensable part of real estate transac-
tions).
181. See 16 RiCHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 92.16,
LEXIS (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2015) (title insurer's duty to defend); id.
§ 92.17 (loss title insurer must pay out).
182. See id. §§ 92.16-.17.
183. MINN. STAT. § 13.045, subdiv. 4b(b).
184. Id. at subdiv. 4b.
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the other hand, it is subject to a participant's real property no-
tice, the statute does not explicitly provide that the title exam-
iner can gain access to the actual document, which is crucial for
determining what the state of title is for a property.
To examine the impact of this provision, consider the two
circumstances that will lead a title examiner to request infor-
mation. In the first instance, an examiner has found a deed by
searching for the name of the protected person. To determine
whether the deed affects the property he is examining, the ex-
aminer requests information from the secretary of state, who
informs the examiner that the property is the property involved
in his search. This being the case, the examiner needs to see
the entire document to examine its provisions. At this point the
examiner knows the location of that property is linked to the
protected person. The secretary of state has no further interest
in keeping the document, since any sensitive information is al-
ready revealed. Despite no further advantage from maintaining
confidentiality, the current Minnesota statute does not explicit-
ly allow the secretary of state to release the entire document to
the title examiner.1 86
In the second instance, consider an examiner who has
searched not for the name of a protected person but rather for
the property owned by the protected person. The examiner dis-
covers that there is a deed for the legal description he searched.
The examiner does not know who the protected person is, but
he knows it must be a program participant. An affirmation
from the secretary of state informing the examiner that the
property is subject to a real property notice will not give the ex-
aminer any helpful information."' The examiner must know
who the owner is to determine whether any other interests
185. See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 112, at 8 (noting that
ownership rights to real estate are determined by a "particular transactional
history for that parcel," which "can only be assessed fully by examining all of
the documents in the chain of title").
186. MINN. STAT. § 13.045 subdiv. 4b.
187. A deed may include real covenants, reserve an easement over the
property for the grantor, or contain any number of other terms. See 14
POWELL, supra note 19, § 81A.06[1] (covenants); 4 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.04[5], LEXIS (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2015)
(reserving an easement). A deed may even be defectively executed. POWELL,
supra note 181, § 92.03 [2] [a]. To determine whether any of these are the case,
an examiner must have full access to the documents.
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have been given by that person."" He could drive to the proper-
ty to see who is in possession, but this may not reveal who the
owner is: the property could be occupied by a tenant, a relative
or friend of the owner, or even some entirely unrelated party.
The easier and surer route is for the secretary of state to re-
lease the protected document to the examiner once it is sure the
examiner is not a danger to the protected person. Without a
provision explicitly allowing the release of a document in this
case, a title examiner cannot fully determine what the state of
title is for a property. 9
As this Part has demonstrated, the Minnesota legislature's
attempt to reconcile the interests of the state's Safe at Home
program and its real estate recording systems still leave signif-
icant concerns to be addressed. Nevertheless, the recent
amendments to the statute represent promising steps toward
balancing the competing interests of address confidentiality
programs and county real estate records. The next Part sug-
gests further changes to fully address the most important con-
cerns of both property records systems and address confidenti-
ality programs.
III. LEGISLATURES SHOULD MODIFY THE MINNESOTA
SAFE AT HOME STATUTE TO INCLUDE OTHER
PROPERTY-RELATED RECORDS AND TO INCREASE
ACCESS FOR AUTHORIZED PARTIES
This Part proposes a statutory approach for states that
wish to expand their address confidentiality programs to pro-
tect victims who are attempting to restart their lives by pur-
chasing property and establishing a new home. The proposed
approach seeks to further the goal of protecting victims whose
abusers track them through public records while minimizing
the impact on the public notice function of real estate records
systems. This Note suggests a legislative approach based on
Minnesota's Safe at Home program, but it also proposes ex-
panding the program's protections to include other real estate-
related records as well as providing increased access to protect-
188. See Szypszak, Public Registries, supra note 62, at 690 (explaining that
an examiner "checking title must develop a chain of ownership by linking
grantors with grantees").
189. See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 112, at 8 (noting that
the interest an owner holds in a property is determined in part by the "trans-
actional history" of the property, which can only be ascertained by a thorough
examination of all the documents involved).
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ed records for authorized parties. Section A discusses addition-
al protections for participants in address confidentiality pro-
grams. Specifically, it suggests that legislation (1) explicitly in-
clude all location-related records; and (2) provide instructions
regarding how each office holding those records should be noti-
fied and how they should handle protected information. Section
B recommends further changes to benefit those involved in the
business of real estate records by (1) allowing standing authori-
zation for certain entities; and (2) permitting access to the full
text of protected documents.
A. EXPAND PROTECTIONS TO OTHER PROPERTY-RELATED
RECORDS
While Minnesota's statute provides program participants
with significant protections, it has several weaknesses that de-
tract from its efforts to shield victims from their abusers. Any
legislation modeled after Minnesota's statute can incorporate
several changes that will significantly improve its protections.
First, it should clearly include and address all records and in-
formation databases that contain location and identity infor-
mation. Second, any legislation should require that the pro-
gram administrator contact every office that maintains this
information and should specify how each office must handle the
location and identity information of protected persons.
1. What Records Should Be Included?
As noted above, Minnesota's Safe at Home statute does not
fully accomplish its mission to protect participants from discov-
ery through real estate-related records. It fails to provide a
mechanism by which victims can protect their location infor-
mation contained in property tax, assessment, sales disclosure,
and GIS record systems. Victims of domestic abuse, sexual as-
sault, and stalking will only be safe in their new homes when
their location information and identity information are kept
separate in all real estate information systems, and when a
method exists for program participants to inform all of the dif-
ferent governmental entities responsible for the various proper-
ty records. Because databases and services that include real
property information may vary from state to state, each state
legislature must consider the systems used by its state and
county government and tailor the statute to account for every




2. How Should the Statute Address the Additional Records?
Minnesota's program does provide some helpful guidance
regarding the method by which victims may inform the admin-
istrators of the various records systems of their protected sta-
tus. Under the Safe at Home statute, participants submit a real
estate notice to the county recorder with specific information
about the affected property. The county recorder then sends a
copy to the secretary of state and the person responsible for
taxation in the county.9 o A similar system would work well for
informing the entities involved with the various real estate-
related records. Program participants are unlikely to know the
different offices to which they need to send notices. Placing re-
sponsibility upon a more knowledgeable government agency
would better ensure that all of the relevant agencies receive no-
tice. Because the secretary of state bears the primary burden of
administering address confidentiality programs in most
states,"' that same entity should bear responsibility for dis-
tributing real property notices to the various government offic-
es. In this way, even if program participants don't understand
the importance of contacting various governmental offices to
suppress tax records, assessment records, GIS records, and
sales disclosure records, their location and identity information
will be protected in all of those systems.
In addition, any statute purporting to protect the real
property interests of participants should specify how each sys-
tem must handle the location and identity information of enrol-
lees who purchase property. This Note commends Minnesota's
approach for balancing the needs of the recording system
against those of victims and finding a solution that protects the
interests of both. By allowing county recorders to place only the
names of protected persons on the grantor-grantee index and
only the property description in the tract index, the statute al-
lows the property records to provide notice while still keeping
participants' identity and location information separate.1 92
For other property-related records, such as tax and GIS in-
formation, this Note supports a balanced approach as well. Vic-
tims are protected best when their location and name infor-
mation cannot be connected. Therefore, protecting program
participants requires suppression of only one type of infor-
190. MINN. STAT. § 13.045, subdiv. 4a(b).
191. See Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, supra note 12.
192. MINN. STAT. § 13.045, subdiv. 4a.
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mation. Given the various methods for presenting location in-
formation and the importance of location information to records
for taxes, assessments, and GIS databases, suppressing name
information appears to be the best approach. When name in-
formation for records such as these is confidential, members of
the public will not be able to perform name searches for pro-
tected persons, nor can they connect a property with any specif-
ic individual. Allowing location information alone, however, will
still permit protected individuals to look up information about
their own properties. This will be particularly useful for ena-
bling participants to access property tax and assessment infor-
mation. This Note therefore proposes that any statute expand-
ing protections for program participants to real property
records should allow only location information of protected in-
dividuals to be released in the various property databases of
government entities other than the county recorder.
B. INCREASE AUTHORIZED PARTIES' ACCESS TO PROTECTED
RECORDS
Just as legislatures following Minnesota's example ought
to supplement the statute's provisions for protected individuals,
they should also consider additional protections for real proper-
ty records. Any legislation modeled after Minnesota's Safe at
Home statute needs to provide entities regularly involved in
examining real estate records with improved access. Such a
statute should (1) allow entities to obtain long-term authoriza-
tion to access protected records; and (2) permit authorized enti-
ties to access the entire content of protected records.
1. Who Should Have Access to Records?
As with many other aspects of address confidentiality, the
Minnesota Safe at Home statute provides a good starting point
for compromise on who should have access to protected records.
Any statute attempting to protect disclosure of location infor-
mation about victims of domestic abuse or stalking should en-
force some system that will keep abusers from gaining access to
protected records. Minnesota's statute provides for a case-by-
case evaluation of each request for further information.! Such
an approach certainly achieves the desired protection and will
likely not burden outside parties if the volume of such requests
remains low. If, however, protected properties are transferred
193. Id. at subdiv. 4b(a).
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frequently or participants with common names start to sell or
buy real estate, a need for such requests will increase. Because
title insurance companies perform most of the title searches for
real estate conveyances, the burden of these requests will fall
primarily on them.1 9 4
Only a small number of title insurance companies handle
the majority of the country's title policies and, consequently, ti-
tle exams, so the secretary of state will likely handle many re-
quests from the same small number of entities. ' This Note
therefore proposes that legislatures permit certain entities to
be approved by the secretary of state for instant access to all
protected real estate records. Such a provision would still re-
quire all other parties to submit requests for any desired in-
formation, but it would allow those entities involved in the
business of real estate transactions to avoid the burden of re-
peated requests.
2. What Should Authorized Parties Be Able To Access?
While it starts on the right path, the Minnesota statute
does not go far enough in allowing outside parties to acquire
the information they need to accurately determine the state of
title for a property. The Minnesota statute allows the secretary
of state to inform title examiners whether the property involved
in their search is connected with a participant in the Safe at
Home program.'96 If the examiner discovers that the land he is
examining is not connected with a participant, he can be sure
no further inquiry is required. If, on the other hand, he discov-
ers that the property he is examining is, in fact, protected by
the program, the secretary of state is not required to provide
any further information. This is not acceptable. Without access
to the entire document, the examiner has no way to determine
what the state of title is for the property.
A balanced approach should allow examiners to fully eval-
uate the state of title to a property by providing a method for
releasing the full content of restricted documents. Whether the
examiner has submitted a request or is a previously authorized
194. See Szypszak, Public Registries, supra note 62, at 683.
195. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-07-401, TITLE
INSURANCE: ACTIONS NEEDED To IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE TITLE INDUS-
TRY AND BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS 3 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d07401.pdf ("In 2005, for example, five insurers accounted for 92 per-
cent of the national market, and most states were dominated by two or three
large insurers.").
196. MINN. STAT. § 13.045, subdiv. 4b.
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party, the secretary of state has already had the opportunity to
make sure he can be trusted. In this way, a statute allowing for
the release of full documents related to a program participant
can still ensure that location information is protected against
unauthorized use and can also avoid impeding the normal op-
eration of real estate transactions.
C. A BALANCED APPROACH BASED ON MINNESOTA'S SAFE AT
HOME STATUTE IS SUPERIOR TO ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE
ONLY THE INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OR OF RECORDS SYSTEMS
Because the purpose of address confidentiality programs in
restricting access to information is directly opposed to that of
real property records, which seek to make information public,
there is no scheme that will fully meet both objectives. The pos-
sible approaches to this conflict include (1) not extending ad-
dress confidentiality programs to any real estate records; (2)
thoroughly protecting victims by not allowing location or identi-
ty information to be disclosed in real estate records under any
circumstances; or (3) developing a system that balances the in-
terests on both sides and preserves the most important aspects
of each.
Nearly every state currently falls into the first category.
Not all states have address confidentiality programs, but al-
most all of those that do, do not currently protect the personal
information of program participants in real property records."'
By not including real estate records in the protections of their
address confidentiality programs, these states guarantee the
stability of their land records systems. As a result, these states
ensure that members of the public can continue to easily de-
termine the state of title for property. This has numerous bene-
fits, not the least of which is that these states avoid any addi-
tional burdens on real estate transactions or any decrease in
the marketability and value of properties."'
In choosing not to offer any additional protections to vic-
tims of domestic violence or stalking, however, these states
perpetuate the struggles of victims who are attempting to es-
cape abusive situations by relocating and purchasing a home.
In addition, they deny victims the benefits of homeownership-
197. See Address Confidentiality Laws, by State, supra note 12.
198. See Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 211 (describing how
"making the public records a more reliable indication of ownership . . . im-
proved the marketability of North Carolina real estate"); Part II.C.2 (explain-
ing the burdens imposed on parties involved in real estate transactions).
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benefits that are not available to victims who must live with
relatives or friends, stay in domestic violence shelters, or rent
an apartment or house." 9 Extending the protections of address
confidentiality programs to real property records will provide a
more achievable alternative for victims who wish to reestablish
their independence and acquire a permanent home that is safe
from their abusers.
As noted above, states have recognized a number of inter-
ests important enough to merit exceptions from the normal
standards of real estate records systems. Judgment liens, me-
chanics liens, tax liens, environmental liens, and probate pro-
ceedings often cannot be found by searching recorded docu-
ments, but they are nevertheless valid interests that affect real
estate. 2 0 0 Allowing one additional special rule for victims of do-
mestic violence would not impede the overall operation of
states' recording systems. Parties involved in real estate trans-
actions already account for the risk that one of these outside in-
terests affects their property. They would be able to account for
an address confidentiality exception as well.
No states have yet pursued the second approach-that of
expanding an address confidentiality program to prohibit loca-
tion or identity information from being disclosed in real estate
records under any circumstances. This framework would guar-
antee that program participants are protected as thoroughly as
possible, ensuring that no stalker or abuser would have access
to any information that would aid them in tracking down their
victims. This is an important consideration, particularly in
light of the dangers stalkers and abusers pose to their vic-
tims.201 Those who seek the protection of address confidentiality
programs do so because they have endured abuse, domestic vio-
lence, or stalking serious enough that they have needed to
leave their homes. If discovered by their abuses, these victims
may face the same dangers again.
Despite the benefits for program participants, the extreme
protections under this approach have some serious drawbacks.
First, the existence of recorded documents that cannot be tied
to a particular property or a particular person creates a sub-
stantial cloud on title for all properties in a county, which, in
turn, has a significant impact on the marketability and value of
199. See HERBERT & BELSKY, supra note 149 (describing benefits of home-
ownership).
200. Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 15, at 210.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
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those properties.2 0 2 Second, suppressing all identity and loca-
tion information in program participant's recorded documents
will likely deprive participants of the protections of state re-
cording acts.2 0 3 This directly undermines the objective of ena-
bling participants to establish new, permanent residences.
In order to secure the protections of recording statutes for
program participants, address confidentiality programs must
allow certain information to be disclosed in the property rec-
ords. While this would diminish the protections of programs,
several states have already shown a willingness to compromise
in other aspects of their address confidentiality programs when
important interests are at stake.2 0 4 It would be entirely con-
sistent, therefore, to allow certain limited exceptions to a
broadened address confidentiality program in order to protect
the title of other properties in the state and to ensure that vic-
tims are able to take advantage of state recording acts.
The third and final alternative is to formulate an approach,
as Minnesota has done, that secures the most important as-
pects of both victim confidentiality and the public notice pro-
vided by real estate records.2 0 5 Minnesota's legislature has been
largely successful in balancing these two interests. However,
Minnesota's program still does not adequately protect victims
of domestic abuse or violence, because it does not address a
number of other property-related records that could potentially
206
reveal the location of program participants. In addition, Min-
nesota's program makes it too difficult for parties regularly in-
volved in real estate transactions, particularly title companies,
to access the information they need.20 7 By addressing these is-
sues, this Note's solution provides more thorough protections
for victims of domestic violence who wish to purchase property
to escape their abusers, and also protects the notice function of
real property records by allowing members of the public to
more easily determine what interests affect their properties.
202. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
203. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
204. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.045 (Supp. 2015) (court order and law en-
forcement); Falconi v. Sec'y of State of Nev., 299 P.3d 378, 384 (Nev. 2013)
("[T]he rights of a custodial parent to know where his or her child resides must
be balanced against the important state interest in protecting victims of do-
mestic violence served by the state's fictitious address program.").
205. MINN. STAT. §§ 5B.01-.12, 13.045 (Supp. 2015); MINN. R. 8290.0100-
.1500 (2015).
206. See supra Part II.C.1.




States are increasingly recognizing the need to protect vic-
tims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, and stalking as they at-
tempt to escape from their oppressors. The protections states
offer vary widely. In some parts of the country victims are of-
fered only small benefits, like confidential voter registration. In
others, individuals are able to use a substitute address for any
governmental entity requiring a mailing address. The most
protective programs allow participants to use a substitute ad-
dress for any purpose, public or private, and permit protected
persons to require nearly complete confidentiality from all gov-
ernment entities. Yet, despite this variety in protections of-
fered, no state has offered sufficient protection for victims wish-
ing to permanently relocate and start new lives by purchasing a
home. Minnesota's Safe at Home statute offers the best poten-
tial solution to relocating victims by providing a means for pro-
gram participants to suppress information about their location
in county real property records. Even so, for all its benefits,
Minnesota's program fails to adequately protect individuals
seeking to avoid discovery when buying a new home. It also
places too great a burden on the parties involved in maintain-
ing and searching county property records.
Legislatures contemplating an expansion of their address
confidentiality programs to protect victims who have decided to
relocate by buying property should modify Minnesota's statute
to ensure full protection for all records related to property con-
veyances and guarantee access to protected records for outside
parties involved in the business of real estate transfers. This
approach will secure victims of domestic abuse and stalking
against discovery through real property records, and will fur-
ther the primary goal of county recording systems to inform the
public of interests affecting real property. A program that im-
plements such a scheme will be a step toward better long-term
solutions for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.
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